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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STA.TE OF' UTAH, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
Case No. 14710 
DON C. COFFEY, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The defendant, Don c. Coffey, was convicted in the 
Fourth District Court, State of Utah, of issuing a back check 
in violation of Section 76-6-505, Utah Criminal Code. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On May 24, 1976, the defendant~appellant was tried 
before a jury in Fourth District Court, the Honorable Allen 
B. Sorensen presiding, and was found guilty of a second degree 
felony. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-appellant, Don c. Coffey, seeks vacation 
of the Judgment rendered in the Fourth District Court and a 
remand for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The undersigned counsel makes no particular quarrel 
with the Statements of Fact appearing in the Briefs of the 
Appellant and Respondent formerly filed in this matter, except 
for the second paragraph of the Public Defender, Mr. John G. 
Mulliner's Brief on behalf of appellant, which says: 
"The check was presented for payment and was 
dishonored. The Defendant did not have sufficient 
funds or credit with Dixie State Bank for payment 
of the check." 
As will be noted hereafter, the undersigned believes 
the proper state of facts were that the defendant indeed stopped 
payment on the check in question, and the stipulation Of Mr. 
Mulliner that appears in the record at page 6 (which also will 
be referred to in detail in the argument hereafter) did not 
admit that the check was presented and dishonored, but stipu-
lated only that there were not sufficient funds or credits in 
the account of the defendant on July 29, 1975, to pay the check 
in question bearing the same date. Other facts or proffered 
evidence will be alluded to in the body of the argument. 
-2-
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ARGUMENT 
THE PUBLIC DEFENDER'S FAILURE TO OFFER AVAILABLE DEFENSES 
DENIED THE DEFENDANT HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A FAIR 
TRIAL. 
At the outset, it is admitted that counsel's neglect, 
irrespective of motive or consequence, is ordinarily binding 
upon his client. (Attorneys at Law, 7 Arn Jur 2d 110.) Recent 
Utah cases adhere to the same rule and generally look with dis-
favor upon defendants who denounce their trial attorney as 
incompetent: Heinlin v. Smith, 542 P.2d 1081 (1975)1 Jara-
millo v. Turner, 465 P.2d 343, 240 Utah 2d 19 (1970)1 Lopez 
v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 23, 465 P.2d 345 (1970). In each of these 
cases, however, the defendant had originally plead guilty and 
sought to avoid the responsibility of his admitted act by 
claiming he was not advised as to the consequences of a guilty 
plea; and in each instance, the Court has viewed such claims as 
abortive attempts to subvert the law. 
There is language in the Jaramillo and Heinlin opinions, 
for example, to the effect that a charge of incompetency is the 
last refuge of the guilty and that the Court views such claims 
with an implicit, if not actual, presumption in disfavor of -
the defendant. But the charge in each of these cases is, as 
the Court perceived, a frivolous "loophole" in light of previous 
admissions the defendant had made. In Heinlin, the defendant 
-3-
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asserted the incompetence of his counsel when he failed to 
move for the suppression of certain admissions made to the 
taking of a consent, yet confirmed the same admissions on 
the stand. Likewise, the defendant in Jaramillo claimed his 
lawyer did not advise him as to the consequences of a guilty 
plea, yet the beginning of the opinion quotes portions of 
the record which undeniably show that defendant's claim was a lie. 
No wonder the Court has been offended by such attempts. 
Nonetheless, this Court has recognized an exception 
to the general rule quoted from Am Jur in Alires v. Turner, 
22 Utah 2d 118, 449 P.2d 241 (1969). In Alires the proffered 
evidence was that the petitioner had given counsel $100.00 for his 
defense, but was never further contacted until sentence was imposed, 
at which time counsel claimed that he did not recall receipt of 
any $100.00 and turned and walked away. The Court found that 
such failure of representation was a departure from due pro-
cess and remanded the case. "The requirement" (of right to 
counsel), writes the Court, "is not satisfied by a sham or 
pretense of an appearance in the record by an attorney who 
manifests no real concern about the interest of the accused." 
Here, unlike the cases previously cited, the defendant proffered 
certain facts, which if made known to a court or jury, may well 
have raised a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. It is sub-
mitted that the case at bar falls under the same ambit as the 
-4-
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Alires case and should be remanded for the same reasons: 
From the record, there is indication that the 
public defender had given little, if any, preparation to the 
defendant's case, and certainly had given no thought to whether 
Mr. Coffey should or should not apply for adult probation once 
the verdict of guilty had been rendered. On page 21 of the 
record, for example, the Court says: 
"Do you have any request as to the time for 
pronouncement of judgment? 
Mr. Mulliner: "Your Honor, I have not discussed 
this with my client. I assume that we will want a 
referral to the adult probation." (Emphasis added.) 
The Court: "Discuss it with him and explain to 
him he has a right to have judgment pronounced in not 
less that four nor more than ten days. If he wishes 
if referred to the probation department, we will 
require considerably more than ten days. Go ahead 
and ask him. " 
It seems strange that Mr. Mulliner would not discuss 
the ramifications of a guilty verdict with the defendant wbefl 
he made not even the slightest attempt to offer a defense. Bad 
he discussed any defense with the defendant prior to trial? 'lite 
record is silent on that question. But even a quick perusal-ef 
the record leaves the reader with unresolved anxiety and C}nawi'ftt' 
ambiguities: 
1. Why, for instance, did Mr. Mulliner stipulate 
that as of July 29, 1975, there were not sufficient funds or 
credit in the account of Don Coffey to cover the check he had 
-5-
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written? (R. P 6.) It is submitted that such a stipulation 
does not prove whether the check was, in fact, refused by the 
bank (as required by the statute 76-6-505). Neither does it 
show whether there was any notice to the defendant that his 
account was overdrawn, that the check would not be paid (also 
as required by the statute) or whether the defendant ever made 
a subsequent deposit (Mr. Ercanbrack did, in fact, receive par-
tial payment - R. 10.) or whether the defendant issued a stop-
payment. Had he done so, the criminal statute would no longer 
be applicable. Why were these issues never raised at trial? 
Why was such a narrow and ambiguous stipulation never challenged 
or clarified? Why was the defendant never called to testify? 
Why did counsel neglect to offer any evidence whatsoever as to 
the conditions upon which the check was written or the reasons 
why it was not paid? 
2. There were also at the time of trial significant 
testimony and defenses which could have been offered, but·:were 
not, on defendant's behalf, and only remotely hinted at during 
cross-examination. It is understood that "ordinarily an appel-
lant may not raise new issues on appeal which were not presen~ed 
to the trial court." Jaramillo, 240Utah·2d 19, Holman v. Chris-
~. 73 Utah 389, 274 Pac 457 (1929). This court has 
overlooked the rule, however, in cases like Alires , where the 
-6-
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defendant on appeal proffered evidence in support of his claim. 
Likewise, in the instant case the defendant, in reliance upon 
his attorney, did not testify as he otherwise would have. 
The facts as claimed by defendant are: 
(a) That Ercanbrack was told to hold the check for 
a certain time until Coffey could arrange his affairs so that 
the check, when deposited, would clear; 
(b) That Ercanbrack cheated the defendant by giving 
him "cull" or low-grade cherries, and by reason of that breach, 
was not entitled to the full amount of the check; 
(c) That Ercanbrack eventually received a partial 
payment for the cherries; 
(d) That Coffey deliberately refused payment on the 
balance of the original contract because he was· cheated. The 
public defender never raised any of these facts; never called 
any of the witnesses which the defendant himself had arranged 
to testify in court, and never contradicted the testimony of 
the State's only witnesses. 
3. Other jurisdictions which have considered the 
inadequacy-of-counsel issue, principally California, have 
relieved a defendant from the judgment of a trial court when 
counsel's lack of diligence or competence reduced the trial to 
a "farce or a sham." People v. Ibarra, 386 P.2d 287 (1963) • 
In a nutshell, the context of Ibarra is that the defendant was 
-7-
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convicted of unlawful possession of heroin in the Superior 
court of Los Angeles County. Defendant appealed on the basis 
that the public defender had failed to object to obviously 
inadmissible evidence allegedly taken from the defendant's 
person. The failure was not, as the court so found, merely 
a strategem, however inept such a move may appear, but the 
record showed that the public defender did not take the neces-
sary preparation time to inform himself of defenses he could 
and should have otherwise asserted. Chief Justice Traynor, 
in writing for the majority, held: 
"Counsel's failure to research the applicable 
law precluded the exercise of judgment on his part 
and deprived the defendant of an adjudication of 
what was clearly the stronger of the two defenses 
available to him ••• Counsel's statement to the 
court makes perfectly clear that his decision 
reflects, not judgment, but unawareness of a rule 
of law basic to the case; a rule reasonable pre-
paration would have revealed. Counsel's failure 
to object precluded resolution of the crucial 
factual issues supporting defendant•s primary 
evidence. It thereby reduced his trial to a 
farce and a sham." 
Both the Alires and Ibarra cases use the word 
"sham" in describing the trial. In the former case, the Utah 
Court remanded because counsel was unconcerned about the 
interests of his client and his appearance in the reoord 
amounted to a "sham and a pretense"; and in the latter case 
the trial attorney's lack of preparation in failing to make 
an obvious objection reduced the trial to a "farce and sham." 
-8-
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It is true that the facts of the case at bar do not show a 
complete failure of representation as in the Alires case. 
But the public defender's failure, in the case at bar, to 
call a single defense witness, though several were available, 
nor raise a single defense or even challenge the State's testi-
mony, had the cumulative effect of denying defendant, Coffey, 
fair representation to a much greater extent than did counsel's 
failure to raise a timely objection in the Ibarra case. 
There is no record in this case of a defense which 
could have been made, only implications that Mr. Mulliner had 
done little, if anything, to prepare. We submit, however, that 
that distinction is insignificant. In both Ibarra and the 
instant case, the public defender has seriously neglected his 
client's interest. Anyone reviewing the record in Ibarra could 
plainly see what the public defender should have done. In this 
case, the public defender's conduct or refusal to act is equally 
demonstrated by the record, and made glaringly deficient by the 
testimony proffered herein. 
Counsel's neglect in the case at bar is no less seri-
ous because his proffered testimony is not explicit in the record. 
Indeed, the very reason Mr. Coffey and/or any of the defense 
witnesses he had scheduled did not testify was because Mr. 
Mulliner had not prepared, was not familiar with the defenses 
of the case and accordingly advised the defendant not to take 
-9-
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the stand. In reliance upon his attorney's advice, Mr. Coffey 
made no defense, which, it is submitted, could only leave the 
jury with the single and mistaken impression that no defense 
was available and that the testimony of the Ercanbracks was 
true. How could the jury possibly conclude otherwise? Even 
if the points Mr. Mulliner raises in his brief are correct, 
the fact remains that the defendant's trial was a farce and 
a sham. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the under-
signed submits that the matter should be remanded for a new 
trial to permit the defendant his true day in court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
MAXWELL A. MILLER 
MADSEN & CUMMINGS 
-10-
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